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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of
JA~IES JOHN LATSIS (also
sometimes known as "Latses"),
Deceased.

I

I

No. 7954

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT VIRGINIA
LATSIS ZAMBUKOS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Virginia Latsis Zambukos, formerly a co--administrator of the Estate of James John Latsis, deceased, received a "Petition" directing the Court's attention to
improper acts and for an Order to Show Cause why the
"Administrators" should not be rqUired to properly administer the Estate (R.183-197). At the time she received
said ~tition (August 1952) Virginia Latsis Zambukos
was not an administrator or co-administrator of the
Latsis Estate. She once held such a pos'ition but was discharged on October 9, 1945, by order of the Probate
Court which had jurisdiction of said Estate and of said
administrators. (R. 133). The Order to Show Cause
was directed to the "administrators" (R. 180, 181) al-
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though no persons any longer held such positions and
the petition was served upon J runes John Latsis (also
sometimes known as Latses) (R. 182). However, Yirginia
Latsis Za:mbukos filed her motion to dismiss said petition.
(R. 198, 199). The Court granted her motion to dismiss.
(R. 204, 207, 208).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE ESTATE OF JAMES JOHN LATSIS, DECEASED,
HAS BEEN PROPERLY AND FINALLY DISTRIBUTED,
THE ADMINISTRATORS HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED AND
THE ESTATE HAS CEASED TO EXIST.

POINT II
A PETITION IN PROBATE IS NOT A PROPER ACTION
FOR THE RELIEF SOUGHT AND MUST BE DISMISSED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ESTATE OF JAMES JOHN LATSIS, DECEASED,
HAS BEEN PROPERLY AND FINALLY DISTRIBUTED:
THE ADMINISTRATORS HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED AND
THE ESTATE HAS CEASED TO EXIST.

The record shows that eve-ry step was properly tal{en
1n the probate of the Estate of James John Latsis.
Counsel for appellants point to no jurisdictional omission. They dip into the record of the proceedings and
point to a certain stipulation prepared by the attorney
for the absent heirs and agreed to by all parties and
from this stipulation argue that the probate proceeding
2
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has not been properly concluded. But by the order of
the Court approving said stipulation,
"The issuance and delivery of checks to such
source. (Hellenic Bank or American Express)
shall relieve the administrators her~in from further responsibility therefor." (R. 96, 97)
In the order approving final account and making distribution and discharging administrator, notice of which
hearing was given in accordance with the Court's order,
(R. 103, 104, 105) the Court approved and allowed the
"settlement, payments and distribution, and provision
for distribution" made pursuant to the order of February
27, 1945. The Court was flllly cognizant of the stipulation and its "provisions for distribution." Every step
thereunder within the control of the administrators had
been taken. The money had be·en provided and turned
over to the attorney for the absent heirs. On the attorney rested the duty to transmit the funds to the parties
whom he represented. Therefore, all steps having been
taken properly, the Court distributed the remaining
assets of the estate and discharged the aillninistrators.
No extrinsic fraud is pleaded or shown. Rule 9 (b) U RCP;
Glover v. Glover (Utah) 242 P2d 298; Howell v. Britton
(Cal.) 119 P2d 333 ; Annotation 88 ALR 1201. The Estate
is closed.
Appellants argue that the stipulation of the parties
and the Court's order approving said stipulation cannot
be varied by a subsequent order of the Court without
notice. Notice to whom~ And notice of what~ The record
is clear that notice of the hearing for final account and
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for discharge of the administrators was made in accordance with law and with the order of the Court. No claim
is made that Mr. Cotro-Manes did not have notice. And
notice was mailed to all heirs-notice that petition was
made for final account and for distribution. And that's
what was done. Distribution was made exactly as agreed
by the heirs through their attorneys. The Estate was
closed and the administrators were discharged.
In all of this argument, appellants persist in their
assumption that Mr. Cotro-Manes could not act for the
absent heirs and could not bind them. But the very purpose of our statute (75-14-25) is to provide adequate
representation of absent heirs and minors without guardians, and at the same time to permit the orderly and
prompt settlement of probate proceedings. If the heirs
are available to choose their own counsel or if minors
have guardians who can act for them and choose counsel,
there is no need for the statute. However, in situations
such as we have here, the law provides for an attorney
by Court appointment who "is ther~by authorized to
represent such parties in all such proceedings had subsequent to his appointment." The proceedings referred
to include "settlements, partitions and distributions of
estates."
Counsel do not attack the statute, but they argue
that what Mr. Cotro-Manes did on ·behalf of the absent
heirs could not bind them unless they receive notice of
his actions and ratified same. If this be true, then the
statute serves no purpose. Estates might be held in
abeyance for years and decades while an attorney sought
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to locate an absent heir to ratify his acts. r~ro avoid such
an intolerable situation is the purpose of the statute.

State v. Dist. Ct. (:Mont.) 57 P 2d 1227;
In rc Otting's Estate, (l\Iinn.) 252 NW 740.
These cases hold that a judge should appoint an
attorney for absent heirs when a necessity therefor
exists. The case in hearing most certainly is one· of necessity. :Mr. Cotro-nianes actively and succeS'sfully protected the interests of his "clients" and secured for them
a fair and generous settlement in 1945. Seven years later
property values seem to have changed, so the absent
heirs want to repudiate what was done. After seven
years they would- reach back and say, "I don't like the
settlement made by my attorney. I'll repudiate it and
maybe get a bigger piece of pie." But not only is their
claim invalid, but it is utterly impossible of fulfillment.
How could these administrators now gather in property
sold (some of it several times) to bona fide purchasers
in good faith and in reliance on a court decree. Must
these purchasers lose~ By what means could the administrators compel transfer back of property~ What of
property that has been dissipated or consumed by an·
heir or hona fide purchaser~ The whole prospect is
ludicrous. There must be some finality to probate proceedings.

POINT II
A PETITION IN PROBATE IS NOT A PROPER ACTION
FOR THE RELIEF SOUGHT AND MUST BE DISMISSED.

Petitioners and appellants claim an interest in real
estate. They contend that title in the property of the

5
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estate vested in the heirs upon the death of decedent, and
they seek now to rmnove "the cloud of the orders of distribution." If this be so, appellants have not proceded
properly to clear their title. 78-40-1 authorizes an action
against another who claims an estate or interest in real
property or an interest or claim to personal property
adverse to him. This then would be an action against all
persons who claim some title or interest in the corpus
of the former estate. Since neither former co-administrator claims or ever had any such title or interest in the
capacity of administrator, they are not proper parties
defendant. They had possession only and that possession
passed from them upon distribution of the estate by the
Court. Virginia Latsis Zambukos acquired and claims
title to certain property formerly in the estate, but she
does so as an heir; not as an administrator. In this action
she is named as an administrator. She is not designated
at any point as an heir and is not in the action in her
individual capacity.
But Virginia Latsis Zambukos has ceased to be an
administrator of the estate. She was discharged in 1945.
She is not here sued as an individual heir and owner;
therefore, the type of action filed is improper and unavailable to petitioners. Their remedy is not by petition
in the probate proceedings. Either they should bring
equitable action to quiet title and determine ownership,
or bring an action at law for damages against the administrators for fraud. These actions, however, must
be brought within the statutory time limit and be upon
grounds permissible by law. Which probably gives a

6
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clue as to why these appellants are so inconsistent and are
trying so hard to bring this n1atter as a petition in probate. After. seven years of sleeping on their rights, they
will be confronted with a statute of limitations defense
if they file a complaint for damages.
CONCLUSION
The Estate of James John Latsis was duly and properly administered and distributed in accordance with
law. The administrators were discharged in 1945. The
Court has no further jurisdiction over said estate and
the administrators. No extrinsic fraud in the administration or distribution was shown. Appellants have selected
the wrong action in which to assert their claims. Therefore, the order of the District Court dismissing appellant's petition was proper and should be upheld.
NOTE:
Respondent Virginia Latsis Zambukos hereby adopts
the statements and arguments made by respondent Utah
Savings and Trust Company in its Brief. The Conclusion
arrived at in said Brief is sound and should be adopted
by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
MOSS & HYDE
Attorneys for Respondent
Virginia Latsis Zamhukos.
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